We investigate the problem of detecting the presence of clandestine neutron sources, such as would be produced by nuclear weapons containing plutonium, within cargo containers. Small, simple and economical semiconductor photodiode detectors affixed to the outsides of containers are capable of producing statistically robust detections of unshielded sources when their output is integrated over the durations of ocean voyages. It is possible to shield such sources with thick layers of neutron-absorbing material, and to minimize the effects of such absorbers on ambient or artificial external neutron fluxes by surrounding them with neutron-reflective material.
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Terrorist nuclear weapons or special nuclear material may be shipped in cargo containers, and their detection is a matter of serious concern. If the special nuclear material is plutonium then its 240 Pu content is a significant source of spontaneous fission neutrons, depending on the quantity of plutonium and its isotopic composition. These spontaneous fission neutrons may be detectable.
In an earlier report 1 we suggested applying 10 B-coated photodiode neutron detectors to the outsides of shipping containers to detect any spontaneous fission neutrons emitted inside. Simple analytic estimates showed that, 1 integrated over a ten day voyage, a 1 cm 2 detector would detect with high statistical significance an unshielded spontaneous fission neutron source in the presence of the background of cosmic ray-induced spallation neutrons.
The purpose of this note is to report the results and implications of quantitative Monte-Carlo neutron transport calculations of this problem, including the effects of shielding and the contents of surrounding containers. These calculations used the MCNPX code 2−4 , which is a standard tool used to calculate neutron transport.
In all of these calculations the assumed source was a sphere of 5 kg of δ-plutonium (radius 4.22 cm). A source strength of 4.5 × 10 5 n/s was chosen (this is appropriate to 10 percent 240 Pu, a compromise between nominal "weapons grade" and "reactor grade" compositions). The results were normalized to the source rate of spontaneous fission neutrons. The plutonium was surrounded by a 50 cm thick spherical shell of nominal "explosive" (composition C 7 N 3 O 6 H 5 and density 1.62 gm −3 ; TNT). This is not meant to be a realistic bomb; rather, it was deliberately chosen as an amateur interpretation of Fat Man (the subject of the Trinity test and dropped on Nagasaki).
The thick "explosive" layer is a fairly effective moderator and reflector and a significant absorber. The assembly is close to thermal neutron criticality (the multiplication factor is 6.0), and for each source neutron there are 20 neutron crossings of the boundary between plutonium and "explosive", while only 0.24 neutrons cross the outer surface of the "explosive".
The source was at the center of a 40 ′ shipping container. The detector was applied to the surface of the container (the container walls were ignored) 2 at a point half-way from bottom to top but 3.29 m displaced from the center of the side of the container along its length, so that the center of the detector was 3.5 m from the center of the source. This location was chosen because three detectors may be applied to the container so that no point within its volume is more than 3.5 m from any detector. Three detectors is a reasonable compromise between the requirements to minimize the number of detectors and to bring every point in the container as close as possible to a detector.
In order to obtain accurate statistics with a feasible number of Monte Carlo particles a disc detector of 1 m radius was used in the calculations, and the inferred count rate scaled to the more practical 1 cm 2 detector.
The detector itself consisted of a 2 µ layer of boron enriched to 80 percent 10 B. In all cases the detector was assumed to have an area of 1 cm 2 . The silicon or gallium arsenide photodiode, perhaps 10 µ thick, is not calculated explicitly, but a (conservative) 0.25 efficiency for detection of (n,α) reactions in the boron is assumed, as discussed by Grober and Katz 1 . This layer is sandwiched between two 1.75 cm thick layers of paraffin or polyethylene (CH 2 of density 0.92 g/cm 3 ) whose purpose is to thermalize neutrons emitted by a bare source. When the source is moderated the CH 2 acts as a neutron reflector (each slab has a scattering optical depth, at normal incidence, to thermal neutrons of 2.8). The thickness of these layers is constrained by the corrugations of shipping container walls, which are about 3.75 cm deep.
If the slabs of CH 2 were not included the detector would be insensitive to an unmoderated neutron source. A more sophisticated system would include detectors with and without sandwiching slabs of CH 2 . Again, the FeH composition was assumed; the spallation neutron production rate is nearly independent of the composition of the non-hydrogenous portion of the material. Therefore, MCNPX calculations were done in which containers containing innocent cargo were irradiated by cosmic rays, and neutron production, transport and reaction were calculated. The sea-level cosmic ray spectrum from 100 MeV to 100 GeV was taken from Pal 5 , and vertical downward incidence distributed uniformly across the top of the container at a flux of 2.7×10 −4 cm −2 s −1 was assumed (this makes it a reasonable 5 approximation to ignore cosmic rays entering the container from the side).
The cosmic rays were assumed to be all protons because the more abundant muons rarely produce neutrons.
The result for irradiation of a single container filled with the same model Unfortunately, anyone capable of building even an improvised plutoniumbased nuclear device is probably aware of the desirability of shielding the spontaneous fission neutrons and is capable of doing so. An effective shield is a 50 cm layer of borated polyethylene or paraffin. A series of calculations was run with such a shield, in the form of a spherical shell of inner radius 54.22 cm and outer radius 104.22 cm containing 5% natural boron by mass.
The result was to reduce the detected counts in the baseline calculation to 0.08, an effective shielding factor of about 4000. This is clearly undetectable. 
